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Abstract 
Social norms have many similarities with Adam Smith`s moral rules of conduct. Basing 
hypotheses regarding social norms on Smith`s theories on moral behavior, this thesis aims to 
study whether social norms help explain social behavior. 
To study social norms, the norm elicitation method of Erin Krupka and Roberto Weber (2013) 
is applied, both with a within- and between-subject design. The hypothetical situations 
concern distributional choices, of which “Person A” is granted full allocations rights of a pool 
of money owned together with another randomly selected “Person B”. Incentivized to match 
the modal answer, participants are to evaluate each actions available to “Person A” on a four-
point scale. The elicited norms are also used to make predictions of actual behavior. Behavior 
is studied separately, in a dictator experiment. 
The experiment gives evidence of an asymmetry in the norm-profile: people judge an 
allocation that is preferable to the recipient as socially appropriate, while they tend to judge an 
action that is preferable to the decision maker as inappropriate. Thus, the norm profiles tells 
us that people care about more than purely the distribution. 
The main social norm is to split the money equally, and more than half of the participants 
comply. However, although people agree more about what is considered socially 
inappropriate than about what is considered socially appropriate, the action-guiding power of 
such norms are very small: almost half of the participants violates the social norm by 
allocating more than half to themselves. Such results suggests that modeling behavior as a 
tradeoff between compliance to a social norm and monetary payoffs would be able to give 
better predictions.  
 
The data was analyzed with the statistical software Stata/IC 14.1 and Microsoft Excel 2016. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except for pleasure of seeing it” 
(Smith 1976 (1759), I.I.1). 
 
Experiments show that minor changes in procedures and instructions alter behavior in dictator 
games dramatically (Hoffman et al. 1986; Fehr and Schmidt 2006; List 2007; Levitt and List 
2007). The evidence of contextual features´ effect on behavior has led to skepticism, i.e. 
regarding the value of generalizing from the lab-results to the field (Levitt and List 2007), as 
well as doubting stable preferences (Levitt and List 2007). However, there is evidence of 
social norms accounting for the observed changes in behavior (e.g. Andreoni and Bernheim 
2009; Konow 2010; Krupka and Weber 2013).  
The founding father of modern economics, Adam Smith wrote about moral rules of conduct –
certain principles by which we naturally judge people`s behavior by (Smith 1976 (1759)). 
The rules regarded what was appropriate behavior within a certain society. Smith saw these 
rules being the results of continual observations of the reactions certain actions provoked in 
others, dependent on the specifics of the situation. Hence process which we judge other by is 
heuristic, not the result of a deliberate calculation.  
Smith`s moral rules of conduct have several similarities with social norms, e.g. that once the 
social norm is internalized, its impact on behavior is not due to deliberate calculations –it is 
following rules based on experience. However, norms is a more modern term and a concept 
highly associated with sociology.  
The traditional view of norms belongs to Emile Durkheim´s tradition which states that norms 
are made up of stable expectations of the social environment and that they are backed and 
sustained by some form of sanctioning. For a norm to be considered “social”, it has to be 
jointly recognized by members of a society. Hence, it makes them a part of the social system, 
though their existence is independent of the individual (Høgsnes 1994). The power of social 
norms thus comes both from human´s willingness to sanction others deviating from the norm 
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and from people´s own emotional experiences after the following of or deviation from the 
norm.  
Elster´s (1989a) definition of social norms concerns behavior rather than outcomes. Thus, 
norm-guided behavior is not outcome-oriented. The motivation of norm-guided behavior is 
thus not the outcome of the action, but rather compliance to the norm. Smith also saw 
individual actions as driven by the propriety of conduct, and thus not solely by the utility 
derived by the outcome; “Smith models rational processes, not a welfare and end-maximizing 
equilibrium of outcomes” (Smith 2016: 262). 
To operationalize Elster (1989) definition of social norms, I will avail the norm elicitation 
method of Krupka and Weber (2013). Their method for eliciting social norms aims to make 
norms quantifiable. The norm eliciting method has been used in several published 
experimental papers (e.g. Erkut et al. 2015; Veselý 2015; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015; 
D`Adda et al. 2016), granting the method legitimacy. Testing the robustness of the method, 
Erkrut et al. (2015) finds that their elicited norms are insensitive to the given role of the 
respondent, that being a dictator, recipient or an impartial spectator. This evidence support the 
method as favorable for studying social norms.  
The overall aim of this thesis is to study whether social norms help explain behavior. It puts 
the norm elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013) in Adam Smith´s theories of moral 
behavior. More precisely, the first main part of the analyses bases it hypothesis on Smith´s 
theory of moral rules of “justice” being more precise than those of “beneficence”. The essence 
of the method is a coordination game where the subjects are incentivized to match the modal 
answer, and thus to reveal their beliefs of modal evaluations.  
To further ensure the validity of norm eliciting method, one experiment entails evaluating 
one`s own moral behavior. If the measured evaluation is in fact representative of a social 
norm, then one´s evaluation of the morality of one´s own behavior should correspond to the 
evaluation of others behavior in an identical situation. To best test whether this is the case, I 
conduct the norm elicitation experiment with a within-subject design. However, the original 
method is of a between-subject design. To test if there are any problems i.e. demand effects, a 
smaller experiment with a between-subject design is also conducted.  
The second main part of the analysis test whether the elicited social norms can explain 
behavior. To study behavior, a dictator game experiment with the same treatment-conditions 
as the norm elicitation experiment is conducted.   
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If the norm eliciting method in fact measures social norms, something other studies indicates 
that it does (Erkrut et al. 2015; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015; D`Adda et al. 2016), the 
operationalization is relevant for economic decision-making theory. My belief is that 
including social norms into economic theory is enriching an already diverse and rich field of 
economics. 
I will start by presenting related literature on dictator games and the on inclusion of social 
norms in behavioral and experimental economics, as well as the norm elicitation method of 
Krupka and Weber (2013).  Then, I will introduce Adam Smith`s moral philosophy regarding 
his moral rules of conduct, and thus show that though incorporating social norms in economic 
theory might be seen as an innovation, it is in fact an old heritage from the discipline`s 
founding father. Thereafter the experiments with its design, procedure and results are 







Chapter 2: Related literature  
In this chapter related literature will be presented. Fist on the dictator game as a method and 
it`s results. Thereafter relevant work on incorporating social norms in economic analysis and 
theoretical models is presented, before finally the norm elicitation method of Krupka and 
Weber (2013) is introduced.  
 
2.1 The dictator game  
The dictator game has become a workhorse in experimental economics (Engel 2011). The 
game equals the first-mover play of an ultimatum game. As the recipient is without veto 
power, the game is without any strategic concerns.  
The original dictator game experiments (Kahneman et al.1986b; Forythe et al. 1994) were 
used to help determine the extent to which generous offers in ultimatum games occurred due 
to fair-minded proposers or due to a fear of having their offers rejected (Camerer and Thaler 
1995). The result suggested that both were plausible explanations, as offers were lower, but 
still positive.  
Since then, the dictator game has been conducted several times. In a meta-study of 129 
published dictator game results, Christoph Engel (2011) finds that the most common choice is 
to keep all to oneself.  To be precise 36,1 percent of the dictators act in line with the 
predictions of a model of pure payoff maximizing. Thereafter the second most common 
choice is an equal split (16,7 percent). However, behavior is sensitive to contextual features 
(Engel 2011).  
Contextual changes and manipulations have also shown to alter behavior in dictator games. 
One example of this is that manipulating the permissible action set, e.g. by including an 
additional option of taking money (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). When the action set includes 
the opportunity to take money, giving nothing is no longer the most greedy option, and 
smaller gifts sufficient to separate oneself from the most selfish types (Dreber et al. 2013). 
Finding that fewer agents were willing to transfer money when the action set include taking, 





As a dictator game is ultimately about distribution, one should expect dictators to give more if 
the recipient`s claim is made more legitimate (Engel 2011). One way of manipulating 
legitimacy is through the assignment of property rights. Bohnet and Frey (1995), and Oxoby 
and Spraggon (2008) finds that the stronger the property rights, the more one will obtain in 
dictator games. There is also evidence of the dictator`s donations being reduced when the 
dictator has made an effort and earned the sum available for distribution (Hoffman et al. 1994; 
Ruström and Williams 2000; Cherry et al. 2002). Feeling more entitled to the money they 
have earned, compared to windfall gains in experiments, people share less. 
Who is initially granted the money, is also related to entitlement. For the “bully” variant of 
the dictator game (Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee 1998), money is initially allocated to the 
recipient. However, the dictator is granted allocation rights. The game is nevertheless about 
distribution. If people solely have distributional preferences, and if such preferences are 
indifferent to who granted the money, the manipulation should not affect behavior. In 
addition, property rights can be viewed as a social convention (Alchian and Demsetz 1973). 
Alchian and Demsetz (1973) defines the strengths of property rights by the extent to which an 
owner`s decision about how a resource are to be used actually determines the use. 
However, the manipulations of the “bully” game has shown to affect behavior relative to the 
standard dictator game (e.g. List 2007; Krupka and Weber 2013). While Krupka and Weber 
(2013) finds evidence that this is due to the payoff-equivalent situations being governed by 
different social norms, one could just as easily explain it by saying that people`s distributional 
preferences change with who is initially granted the money. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that Dreber et al. (2013) finds no treatment-effect in his “bully” experiment.  
Behavior in dictator games` sensitivity to contextual features show how results are not very 
robust to treatment effects (Camerer and Thaler 1995; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Levitt and 
List 2007). Such evidence led Levitt and List (2007), among others, to doubt the external 
validity of laboratory experiments measuring social preferences. However, the evidence is 
consistent with the alternative explanation of social context serving as a coordination devise –
entering the subjects` beliefs rather than their preferences (Ellingsen et al. 2012; Dreber et al. 
2013). Hence, the presence of social framing effects does not prove that preferences are 
sensitive to context (Rabin 1998; Fehr and Schmidt 2006). However, it can also be explained 




2.2 On incorporating social norms in behavioral and experimental 
economics 
In economics, social norms are often studied indirectly or incorporated only as post-hoc 
explanations for behavior and outcomes that are otherwise hard to explain. The fact that social 
norms are often vaguely defined, making them difficult to operationalize or draw predictions 
from is often mentioned as a reason why (Bicchieri and Chavez 2010; Krupka and Weber 
2013). This sub-chapter will nevertheless review relevant work done on incorporating social 
norms in behavioral and experimental economics, within both analytic and economic 
frameworks.  
Extracting norms through observed behavior, as a kind of revealed preference, implies an 
indirect identification of the norm (Fehr and Smidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; 
Andreoni and Miller 2002). However, this approach to infer norms is not only ad hoc, but 
fails to distinguish between collective habits and social norms. Neither does it give basis for 
distinguishing between preferences for specific outcomes and preferences for norm 
compliance (Bicchieri 2006; Burks and Krupka 2012).  
By contrast, Krupka and Weber (2009, 2013), and Andreoni and Bernheim`s (2009) studies 
social norms directly. Manipulating the presence of social norms by variating the features of 
the choice context, they both find that the resulting changed behavior is consistent with the 
preference for complying with the current social norm. Benjamin et al. (2010) also finds that 
preferences are dependent on social context and social identity.  
A social norm is a collectively held perception within a population (Elster 1989a). It is a 
longstanding tradition in psychology to distinguish between collectively held norms and 
personal ethical opinions (Schwartz 1973; Elster 1989a and 1989b), as they need not overlap. 
To distinguish between the two, Burks and Weber (2012) use an incentivized experimental 
method (the same as Krupka and Weber 2013) where the subjects are asked to match a target, 
and for the personal ethical evaluations. However, they are not incentivized.  
The reactions provoked in others by our behavior, often in the form of informal sanctions, 
leads to maintaining and enforcement of social norms in a society (Høgsnes 1994; Fehr and 
Gächter 2000; Bénabou and Tirole 2006). Thus, it has been seen as beneficial to study norms 
in sequential games where people are able to react to other`s actions (e.g Fehr and 




How social norms impact behavior is easily incorporated into an otherwise standard utility 
maximization framework (e.g. Kimbrough et al. 2014; Levitt and List 2007). In newer studies 
they are often incorporated in social preference models that revolve around the hypothesis that 
people trade-off material benefit against compliance with a social norm (e.g. Andreoni and 
Bernheim 2009; Konow 2010; Krupka and Weber 2013). As social norms are by definition 
context-specific, such social preference models are able to account for why behavior in 
dictator games are sensitive to context (see subchapter 2.1).  
Without trying to discard the rational choice models, it has been argued that the 
“Appropriateness Framework” (AF) may have a greater explanatory power than the expected 
utility framework (EU), especially if social dimensions are apparent. The framework is based 
on March`s “Logic of Appropriateness” (1994), an idea of a decision process involving i) 
situational recognition, ii) identity, and iii) rule based choice. The AF has a large emphasis on 
decision making as a heuristic and rule driven process, turning EU into only one of many 
decision rules that might apply to a situation (Kopleman et al. 2004).  
Regarding the evidence of behavior in dictator games being sensitive to context, AF 
highlights that labels and descriptions used to frame a situation, will evoke different 
interpretations of the situation and what is considered appropriate. Thus, the frames will cause 
different behavior in otherwise identical situations (March 1994; Messick 1999; Kopelman et 
al. 2004). This holds even though the economic structure is described and understood 
(Messick 1999). Within the AF the rules applied to choices will often be a consequence of 
social norms, as they are “guidelines for socially appropriate behavior” (Cialdini et al. 1999: 
195). 
Nevertheless, whether one models social norms with an EU or an AF framework, one 
question remains: as social norms are context-dependent, how can one mathematically model 
a contextual features` impact on behavior? If Krupka and Weber`s (2013) norm elicitation 






2.3 The norm elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013)  
Offering evidence of how behavior in the dictator games change due to social norms, the 
norm elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013) is an important contribution and an 
innovation to the literature and to experimental methodology. Primarily due the novelty of 
their norm elicitation method: making social norms quantifiable.  
 
“Allowing norms to govern actions, rather than outcomes, suggests that two actions 
that produce the same outcome, but differ in other respects, may be governed by 
different social norms” (Krupka and Weber 2013: 498) 
 
Krupka and Weber (2013) argue that behavior`s sensitivity to contextual features in 
experiments can be interpreted similar to how behavior in society is sensitive to context. 
Standing as a counter notification to the skepticism posted by Levitt and List (2007), they 
turned what previously had been seen as a violation of stable preferences into an argument for 
including social norms in economic models.  
Krupka and Weber (2013) characterize the social norm by the profile of appropriateness 
ratings over all the actions available to the decision maker. This is in line with John Elster`s 
(1989a) definition of social norms. To enable quantification of social norms, they formalize 
Elster`s (1989a) definition of social norms. 𝐴 = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝐾} denotes all the K actions 
available to the decision maker. A social norm is attached to each of the available actions. The 
social norm 𝑁(𝑎𝑘) ∈ [−1, 1] is an empirically measurable collective judgement, stating the 
actions` appropriateness (𝑁(𝑎𝑘) > 0) or inappropriateness (𝑁(𝑎𝑘) < 0). If an action is 
considered inappropriate, the social norm is that the action should not be taken.  
To form the norm profile, elicitation is done by the respondents playing a pure matching 
coordination game. As norms reflect collective perceptions (Elster 1989), the coordination 
game is considered a suitable method. Respondents are incentivized to match the modal 
answer i.e. respond according to the majority. Thus, they are not inzentivized to reveal their 
personal preferences.  
 As the pure coordination games have many equilibria, excluding a natural focal point is 
important. Thus, the evaluations are done one a four-point scale without a middle evaluation 
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category. A large degree of coherence in the answers should thus imply the existence of a 
social norm. As demonstrated by Metha et al. (1994) and Sugden (1995), the prominence 
derived from a common culture and shared experiences can create focal points in pure 
coordination games. 
As Krupka and Weber (2013: 501) writes themselves: “…our elicitation method will yield a 
representation of a social norm if (a) there is general social agreement that some actions are 
more or less socially appropriate, constituting the social norm, and if (b) respondent 
attempting to tacitly match others` responses rely on such shared perceptions to help them do 
so.”  
Based on the hypothesis that people trade-off material benefit against acting in compliance 
with a social norm1, behavior is modeled within the framework of the following utility 
function:  
                                          𝑢(𝑎𝑘) = 𝑉(𝜋(𝑎𝑘)) +  𝛾𝑁(𝑎𝑘)  ,                                  (1) 
𝑁(𝑎𝑘) being the elicited social norm of that action, 𝜋(𝑎𝑘) representing the monetary payoff 
produced by that action. An individual`s utility of a particular action is dependent on the 
degree to which the individual cares about complying to the norm (𝛾) and the value placed on 
the monetary payoff (derived from the function V( )). According to this model, an individual 
who is entirely unconcerned with social norms (𝛾 = 0) will select the payoff-maximizing 
action. It also follows that if 𝛾 ≠ 0, an individual`s behavior will be dependent on the social 
norm (N(ak)). Such preferences suggests that behavior will change substantially across 
situations governed by different norms, though the sets of payoff remains identical. 
Imposing a linear restriction on V( ), Krupka and Weber (2013) estimate the utility function 
of equation (1), using both the elicited norms and behavioral data from the dictator 
experiment. As I understand it, the estimation is based on the already elicited data, which 
makes for predictions within the sample. Thus, it is not a traditional prediction per se. In 
addition, they solely postulates the trade-off between social norms and payoffs without giving 
an explanation. Hence, their utility function does not deepen our understanding of why people 
care about conducting to social norms. Still, it offers a model of observed human behavior in 
social contexts where social norms apply.  
                                                 
1 A hypothesis also shared by e.g. Andreoni and Bernheim 2009, Konow 2009 and 2010 
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While modifying the standard assumptions, Krupka and Weber (2013) are still within the 
borders of conventional economic theory. This can be viewed as a form of post-rationalization 
where social norms are included as an assumption. While their model does not comment on 
how the norms emerge, it make them quantifiable and thus enables them to study how they 
affect behavior.  
The methodical core of Adam Smith´s moral theory differs from standard economic theory, 
and therefore also from behavioral economics (Tjøtta 2015). In this respect, the utility model 
of Krupka and Weber (2013) is not in line with Smith theories concerning how moral rules of 
conduct affect human behavior. It is not the case that Smith denied monetary payoffs as a 
source of human motivation. Nevertheless, for this experiment, I will only use the norm 







Chapter 3: Including Social Norms in Economics -an innovation 
or old heritage?  
 
The word ´economics´ originates from the Greek word “oeconomicus” (oikos (house) and 
nomos (laws or rules)) (Kishtainy 2017). However, “nomos” translates into rules and hence 
does not imply norms, but rather to economics` search for objective economic rules of how 
the economy functions.  
Adam Smith also searched for objective laws on how the economy functions. Smith is 
classified as a Scottish enlightenment philosopher. Living in Scotland in the starting phase of 
the industrial revolution, he aimed to describe the changes he observed in society.  
As a moral philosopher, Smith aimed to provide an understanding of how moral behavior and 
practice arose in societies (Haakonssen 2002). His science was built on empirical observations 
(Haakonssen 2002), obtained by studying human actions in regular situations. His book 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) (1976 (1759)) has been said to be a study of “the process 
by which we learn the principles of morality form the experience of common life.” (Nicholas 
Phillipson 2012: 150) 
Though the Wealth of Nations (1986 (1776)) is what Smith is most known for, his first but 
also last published book2; TMS has recently received newfound interest. Especially by 
behavioral and experimental economists, e.g. by Camerer and George (2004:5) who thinks 
TMS has “laid out psychological principles of individual behavior that are arguably as 
profound as his economic observations.”  
The fact that TMS has been rediscovered may be due to its theories being quite modern. The 
theories are based on observations of human behavior. In addition, it contains several 
antecedents of the current developments within the field of behavioral economics, i.e. 
Kahneman and Tversky`s (1979) concept of loss aversion, and reciprocity as a determinant of 
human behavior (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1986a; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Ashraf and Camerer 
2005).  
The remaining parts of this chapter offers an explanation of Smith´s moral philosophy, 
especially his theory of what he called “moral rules of conduct” –a theory based on 
                                                 
2 TMS was first published in 1759, and then revised six times. The latest revised version was published in 1790. 
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observations of what human judge as moral or immoral. I like to think of Smith`s moral 
theories as a positive economic theory of normative opinions in society. The “nomos” in 
Smith`s “economics” might just imply social norms. Thus, incorporating social norms in 
economics can be viewed as heritage from Smith himself.  
 
3.1 Smith`s moral philosophy  
To better understand Smith`s moral philosophy, I find it useful to relate it to his political 
philosophy. Especially his critique of Thomas Hobbes` Leviathan (1996 (1651)) - one of the 
main works of the previous century. Whereas Thomas Hobbes believed the social contract 
vindicated in the state as a necessity to avoid a “war against all”, Smith did not think a 
stateless society necessarily implied a lawless one. 
 
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary 
to him, though he derives nothing from it except for pleasure of seeing it” (Smith 1976 
(1759), I.I.1). 
 
The quotation is the first sentence of TMS, belonging to the chapter “Of sympathy”. The 
sentence tells a lot about Smith`s theory of human behavior. Primarily, it tells us that even 
though Smith did not deny humans to be selfish, his observations also gave evidence of 
people taking interest in other humans, and its necessity for human happiness. This was 
something that came naturally -a part of human nature. In addition, it tells us that Smith did 
not think in the lines of utility maximizing when explaining human behavior. Rather, his 
theories of human behavior is one of moral, imagination, sympathy, experience, an impartial 
spectator, and of moral rules of conduct.   
So whereas Hobbes` reasoning for a “war against all” came from what he described as the 
selfish nature of human beings, Smith took another view. Though he did not deny humans` 
selfish nature, he believed in a “mutual sympathy” between people, working as a motivation 
for the evolution of moral rules of conduct with or without the state`s existence. Thus, a 
stateless society did not necessarily imply a lawless one.   
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3.2 Sympathy through imagination  
“By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves 
enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations,” 
(Smith 1976 (1759), I.I.2)  
 
Smith`s concept of sympathy is based on imagination only. When observing others, one can 
never really know what another person is sensing, nor can we be certain of his intentions. 
Observing the circumstances and behavior, one can only imagine others sensations and 
intentions. However, not only an action`s outcome, but also the perceived intentions of the 
actor is of importance to economic decision making (Brandts and Sola 2001; McCabe et al. 
2003; Offerman 2002; Falk et al. 2003 and 2008; Veselý 2015).  
According to Smith, the imagination constitutes a mental faculty used to create a distinctively 
human sphere within the ‘real’ world (Haakonssen 2002). It is through sympathy, as formed 
by our imagination that the moral world is created. When observing others, it is through our 
imagination we feel sympathy, and it is dependent on the characteristics of the situation.  
Smith`s concept of sympathy differs from how the term is commonly used (Haakonssen 
2002). When explaining the term in TMS, he begins with the ‘the sense of propriety’, i.e. the 
judgment of correctness or weather something is right or wrong. To Smith, moral approval 
was a result both of sympathy with the agent and the person affected by the agent`s action 
(Raphael 1972). 
 
“To approve of the passion of another… , is the same thing as to observe that we 
entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such, is the same thing 
as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them” (Smith 1797: I.III.1.) 
 
When assessing the morality of other`s actions one act as an impartial spectator. One first 
imagine oneself in the shoes of the agent. If the actor acts as the impartial spectator would act 
in a particular situation, sentiments correspond. The correspondence is one of sympathy. 
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Consequently, it causes approval of the agent`s motive as one finds it to be “proper” or 
“appropriate”.  
The act of sympathetic understanding is a creation of the imagination. It is an imagined 
reasoning for the observed behavior (Haakonssen 2002). This implies that as moral agents, 
other people and we ourselves are creations of our own imagination. We only gain self-
consciousness through our relationships to others, i.e. through society.  
 
“Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he 
wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, 
which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; 
and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the 
beauty and deformity of his own mind.” (Smith 1976 (1759), III.I.3) 
 
According to Smith, society, with its moral rules, mirrors our actions by the reactions 
provoked in others. These reactions thus enforce the moral rules. The power of the moral rules 
stemming from peoples` reactions are a common feature with social norms (Elster 1989, Fehr 
and Gächter 2000, Lopez-Perez 2008, Krupka and Weber 2013).  It is our understanding of 
other`s view of us, given the circumstances we find ourselves in, that shapes our view of who 
we see ourselves as. Without being a part of society, one cannot judge the morality of one`s 
actions.   
As impartial spectators, we also take into account the feelings of the person affected by the 
action of the agent. This a ‘second sympathy’ (Raphael 1972). It is the conjunction of these 
two sympathies that give rise to the ‘sense of merit’ of the action. Having double sympathy, 
one judges the action of the agent as ‘meritorious’, i.e. to deserve the reaction it causes in the 
one affected by his action.  
 
3.3 The moral rules of conduct  
When it comes to judging our own actions and sentiments, Smith seems to think it happens in 
much of the same way of which we judge others: 
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“to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator 
would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation… we approve of it, by 
sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter 
into his disapprobation, and condemn it.” (Smith 1976 (1759), III.I.101) 
 
The principles that we judge behavior by are what Smith calls ‘moral rules of conduct’. They 
are rules of what is considered appropriate. They are positive and based on experience of 
people`s reactions, and from continual observations. Though a more modern term, Smith`s 
moral rules can relate to social norms on several levels, e.g. that they both are abstract rules 
separating appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Furthermore, they are both depending on 
the situation, i.e. context specific.  
 
“Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed 
enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble 
upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the 
execution of any human design.” (Ferguson, 1995 (1767): III.II) 
 
Viewing social rules as the result of an evolutionary process, alien to human design, was 
common among the Scottish enlightenment philosophers. Emerging from mutual sympathy, 
moral rules of conduct are the result of an evolutionary process, based on experience. This 
makes Smith´s theory inductive (Tjøtta 2015). As for social norms, judging the conduct of 
character is not a contemplated, calculated action.  
 
 “He desires, not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or to be that thing which, though it 
should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise. He 
dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it 
should be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of 




According to Smith, people want to do right and be righteous and dislike blame. Not only do 
they want to be perceived as a praiseworthy person, they want to be praiseworthy (Tjøtta 
2015). Being social beings, people also want to share or sentiments with other people. They 
also long for mutual sympathy; “nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a 
fellow-feeling with all the emotions in our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by 
the appearance of the contrary” (Smith 1976 (1759), I.II.1). 
Mutual sympathy can thus be considered as a motivation for compliance to the moral rules. 
Nevertheless, individual action is only limited by the rules of conduct to the extent that they 
themselves wanted to comply. However, by internalizing the external spectator we try to 
anticipate the assessment which will be imposed on us. This anticipating sympathy enables us 
to adjust behavior to avoid any potential conflict (Haakonssen 2002). This also applies to 
actions conflicting with our own self-image. To Smith, human action is more motivated by 
one`s own ego, than they are outcome-oriented.   
 
3.4 Justice and Beneficence 
In TMS Smith concludes that throughout history, there has existed a dividing line between the 
‘negative’ virtue of justice and the ‘positive’ virtues such as benevolence (Haakonssen 2002). 
Justice is a ‘negative’ virtue as it requires abstinence from injury of others, and beneficence a 
‘positive’ one as it concerned the promotion of good for others or oneself. 
 
Due the uncertainty of man`s life and heterogeneity in individuality and cultures, Smith saw it 
as impossible to formulate a universal rule of a good life. Hence, the positive virtues could 
only be characterized in very general terms. Without knowing the other person, the action-
guiding powers of the positive virtues was small. Thus, the general rule of beneficence was 
loose and inaccurate, making it difficult for the state to regulate people`s conduct according to 
these rules. 
 
By contrast, to cause anybody harm, can be recognized by every man as harmful. In turn, the 
virtue of justice regulates behavior between strangers. Accordingly, the negative virtue of 
justice is much more precise than the positive ones. In fact, Smith viewed justice to be so rule-




The virtue of justice and beneficence translated into different moral rules of conduct. While 
justice is rules of the kind “do not harm other people, even strangers” or “keep your promise”, 
beneficence is rules like “be good to your neighbor” (Tjøtta 2015). Justice primary required 
individuals to retain from hurting others with intent (Raphael 1972), whereas acts of 
beneficence are acts that are done with proper motives and deserve reward. They are the 
proper objects of gratitude.   
 
Smith observed that humans even without ever reflecting upon the necessity of justice for the 
order and existence of society, loathe injustice and agree about the necessity of punishment of 
unjust acts (Ashraf 2005). Justice was the main pillar, upholding the order of society:  “If it is 
removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society…must in a moment crumble to 
atoms.” (Smith 1976 (1759), II.II.18).  The rules of justice were comparable with rules of 
grammar as they were precise, accurate, and indispensable.  
 
However, rules of beneficence are loose and imprecise. Hence, beneficence is ‘free’, in the 
sense that; as long as it does no positive harm to others, failing to provide an act of 
beneficence does not deserve punishment (Raphael 1972). Nevertheless, it might cause 
resentment. Beneficence is thus not enforceable with the threat of punishment. When 
observing acts of beneficence, the actor is not motivated by escaping punishment. However, 
justice is not free, as it is enforceable by the threat of punishment. However, Smith observed 
that there was a strong agreement that the violation of justice ought to be punished 
(Haakonssen 2002). Compliance to justice however, did not necessarily make for a 
praiseworthy character. This implied an asymmetry in reactions from third parties when it 
came to norm violations and compliance of the two types of norms (Haakonssen 2002).  
 
Table  1: The asymmetry in people`s reactions 
 Justice Beneficence  
Violating the norm Punishment  May provoke disapproval 
Following the norm  No reward  Reward  
 
The asymmetry in people`s reactions will later be used in the design of the experiment and for 
the analyses –exploiting it to study the moral rules of justice and beneficence. However, 
punishment and reward will be in the form of positive and negative evaluations of the actions 
undertaken by the decision maker, respectively.   
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Chapter 4: The Experiments 
4.1 Experimental design  
The aim of the experiment is two-folded, though coherent. First, I aim to test Adam Smith`s 
theories of moral rules of conduct on elicited social norms, and on participant`s evaluations of 
their “own” behavior. I will use the norm elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013).  
Based on the elicited norms, I will make predictions regarding actual behavior. Behavior is 
observed separately, through a dictator game experiment. The dictator experiment will have 
identical treatment-condition as in the norm elicitation experiment. The treatment-condition 
consists of framing the action as “to take” or “to give”.    
The experiments are based on a distributional situations where randomly selected “Person A” 
and “Person B” together own a common pool of 1000 NOK ($115). However, “Person A” is 
granted the provision rights, which relative to “Person B” grants him a higher level of 
property rights (Alchian and Demsetz 1973).  
Evidence suggests that as the windfall earnings stems from a commonly owned pool, an equal 
split will presumably be the most social appropriate and acceptable distribution (e.g. Andreoni 
and Bernheim 2009). If so, the dominant social norm becomes “Split the windfall equally.” 
However, this being the social norm for this particular experiment is only a presumption.  
 
Concerning the hypothesis for the social norms, they are based on the following quotations 
from TMS:  
i.) “The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of the 
other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for what is sublime and elegant in 
composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and indispensable. The other, are 
loose, vague, and indeterminate…” (Smith 1979, III.I.123).   
, and the subtitle added at the 4th addition of TMS:  
ii.) “An essay towards an analysis of the principles by which men naturally judge 
concerning the conduct and character, first of their neighbors, and afterwards of 
themselves.”  
Turning these quotations into testable hypothesis, they become as follow: i.) “Evaluations of 
the “injustice domain” will be more precise than the evaluations belonging to the 
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“beneficence domain”, and ii.) “One`s own evaluations of one`s hypothetical actions will be 
similar to that of identical acts done by others in an identical situation.”  
 
Figure 1: Injustice- and Benficence in payoff domain, payoff (decision maker, recipient)  
 
Exploring the asymmetry in people`s reactions (see table 1), figure 1 shows the “injustice” 
and “beneficence domain”. The “injustice domain” is defined by the actions which are 
evaluated as socially inappropriate, and hence actions that should not be undertaken. 
Condemning the actions as inappropriate can be interpreted as a form of punishment. On the 
other hand, the “beneficence domain” will consist of the actions evaluated as socially 
appropriate.  
The dominant social norm is given by the most socially acceptable/ least inacceptable action. 
It seems reasonable to believe that the dominant social norm will be to split the common pool 
equally (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). If so, it is reasonable to assume that the “injustice 
domain” will be defined by all actions where the decision maker allocates more than half to 
himself. Likewise, the “beneficence domain” will consist of the actions where the decision 
maker allocates more than half to the recipient. I presume those actions to be evaluated as 
socially appropriate, and accordingly one is free to make them without facing negative 
reactions from others (Haakonssen 2002). If so, this would fit with the asymmetry in people`s 
reactions. 
 
To best study whether people evaluate their own actions in line with how they evaluate those 
of others, the norm elicitation experiment is conducted with a within-subject design, i.e. each 
individual evaluates all the hypothetical situations. However, to my knowledge this has not 
yet been done. Nevertheless, as the incentive is to match the modal answer, there is reason to 
 
      
(1000,0) Dominant social norm         (0,1000) 
Injustice domain Beneficence domain
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believe that it can be conducted as a within-subject experiment. To test for any problems e.g. 
demand effects, the experiment is also conducted with a between-subject design.  
The experiments are conducted with two different frames of the action. The distributive action 
is either framed as “to take” or “to give”. These treatment-conditions are done to check 
whether the elicited norms are connected to/ dependent on the wording, or if it constant across 
the treatment-condition. If the social norm is robust across treatment-conditions, it is 
reasonable to presume it rather to be connected on the other contextual features. It might be 
reasonable to believe that “to take” is more associated with injustice, while “to give” is more 
associated with beneficence. If so, it should influence the norms respectively, and the framing 
will lead to two different social norms. 
Futhermore, if people solely have preferences over distributions, the treatment effect should 
have no effect as the available action set are identical in both situations. If people only base 
their evaluations on the allocations made, the evaluations will be symmetric. In other words: 
their evaluations of two payoff-equivalent actions that only differ with respect to whether it is 
“Person A” or “Person B” who is granted which amount, will be evaluated identical, i.e. their 
evaluations are indifferent the role of the decision maker. 
 
4.1.1 The norm elicitation experiment 
The norm elicitation experiment is based on the method of Krupka and Weber (2013). 
However, in this experiment, the method will be conducted both with a within- and between-
subject design. The elicited norms of this experiments was used to test the hypothesis based 
on Smith`s moral rules of conduct, and used to make new predictions of actual behavior. The 
experiment was conducted with both a within- and between-subject design.  
To elicit the social norms, participants are asked to evaluate three different hypothetical 
situations where of a “Person A” faces different possible action choices. The action choice is 
either framed as “to give” or “to take”. They are asked to evaluate each action on a four-point 
scale going from “very socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, 
“somewhat socially appropriate” to “very socially appropriate”. To avoid a natural focal 
point, there is no middle or neutral category.  
The appropriate-ratings made for the primary outcome measured in this experiment, and are 
denoted as N(ak). The ratings are turned into a scale of social appropriateness [−1, 1], where 
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“very socially inappropriate” and “very socially appropriate” represent each endpoint, 
respectively. Furthermore, I assume that the distance between the categories are equal. Thus, 
somewhat socially inappropriate” and “somewhat socially appropriate” is given the value 
minus one third, and one thirds, respectively. Furthermore, I assume both endpoints to be at 
an equal distance from the neutral point, zero, which separates socially appropriate form the 
socially inappropriate.  
To avoid any misunderstandings, the participants were presented with an example of people`s 
reaction to a socially inappropriate action. They were told that a socially acceptable action 
was to be understood as what most people agree to be a "correct" or "ethical" thing to do.  The 
instructions (see Appendix B) then presented the participants with an example of a 
hypothetical situation, as well as an example of how they might indicate their ratings for each 
action for the given situation3.  
The participants were then presented with the monetary incentive: for one randomly selected 
action, three of the participants who`s evaluation matched the modal rating, would be 
randomly selected to be paid an additional 500 NOK ($60). This gave the participants salient 
incentives to respond in line with what they truly believed to be the modal rating for each 
possible action available to “Person A”. The monetary incentive was written in bold letters. In 
addition, the participants were reminded of this incentive in each of the situations, except for 
the one where they were asked to evaluate their own behavior.  
For the within-subject designed experiment, the participants were then presented with the 
different hypothetical situations, for which they were to give evaluations. For each action 
choice, the respective monetary payments to each individual were listed. The order in which 
the hypothetical situations were presented was not randomized. For two of the hypothetical 
situations the subjects are asked to evaluate the actions of others, and paid to match the modal 
answer.  
For the last evaluations, the participants of the within-designed experiments were asked to 
evaluate the actions as if it was conducted by themselves. This evaluation has no monetary 
incentive. Just as the Burks and Krupka (2012) experiment, the subjects are asked to reveal 
their own personal beliefs. The experiment was conducted both with a within- and a between-
subject design, but the evaluation of one’s own hypothetical behavior was only part of the 
                                                 
3 In the example (also listed in Appendix B), “Person A” finds a wallet at a coffee shop. This is the same 
example as Krupka and Weber (2013) uses.  
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within-subject designed experiment. Regarding the between-designed experiment, the 
participants were only presented with one of the two treatment-conditions.  
4.1.2 The dictator experiment 
To study actual behavior, two different variations of the dictator game where conducted, each 
matching one of the hypothetical situation in the norm elicitation experiment. The only 
difference between the two was the framing of the action. In one treatment condition the 
action was framed as “to take” money from the common pool, and in the other, it was framed 
as “to give”. The experimental design of the dictator experiment had a between-subject 
design, as one participant was presented only with one of the two versions.  
After being asked to fill out some personal characteristics, the participants was given some 
information regarding the experiment, i.e. the monetary incentive. In each session, two 
participants were randomly selected to get one of their decisions realized. They were 
informed that being selected was independent of which decision they had made.  
Each participant was then presented with a dictator decision. The participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two treatment-conditions. The formulation of the description of the 
situation was made in general terms to match the formulation of the hypothetical situation in 
the norm elicitation experiment as much as possible4.  
Then, the participant was asked to make a decision as if they were “Person A”. Dependent on 
the treatment-condition, they were asked how much they wanted to take/ give. The decisions 
of the amount they would like to take/ give represent the primary outcome measured in this 
experiment.   When making their decision, they would tick off an alternative in a table as the 
one presented in figure 1. Figure 1 show the alternatives when the action is framed as “to 
take”.   
Table 2: Table for decision-making, “take” dictator game   
                                                 
4 Instructions for the dictator experiments can be found in Appendix A 
I choose to take:  Your answer: 
Nothing 
(0 NOK for you, 1000 NOK to Person B) 
 
250 NOK 
(250 NOK for you, 750 NOK to Person B) 
 
500 NOK 
(500 NOK for you, 500 NOK to Person B) 
 
750 NOK 
(750 NOK for you, 250 NOK to Person B) 
 
Everything 





4.2 Experimental procedure  
The experiments where run together with another master student at the University of Bergen, 
Sondre Vågenes Michelsen. This mainly entailed two things: i) for the within-subject 
designed norm-elicitation experiment, each subject evaluated five different situations whereof 
three belonged to this experiment. The order was not randomized and as follow: 1) “to give” 
treatment condition, 2) other experiment, 3) “to take” treatment-condition, 4) other 
experiment, 5) evaluations of their own hypothetical behavior. ii) For the dictator game 
experiment, each subject took two decisions. Each of the two dictator games were paired with 
another decision-making experiment, and the order was randomized.  
 
4.2.1 Within-subject designed experiment  
The experiment consisted of four sessions, all conducted by pen and paper. A total number of 
119 students participated5. Each participant was only able to participate in one session, and 
excluded from participating in the dictator game experiment. The sessions were run the same 
day and place as the dictator game experiment, 28th of February 2017 at the Citizen Lab at the 
DIGSSCORE6 facilities. The average number of participants per session was 30.  
All of the participants were recruited through Hroot7. One week before the experiment took 
place, registered Hroot-members got an invitation email (see Appendix C). The invitation 
included information about time and place, as well as the show-up fee of 50 NOK (6 USD), 
incentivizing people to register. 24 hours prior to the experiment, registered participants got 
an email reminding them of the time and place of the experiment.  
Entering the lab, the participants drew an ID-number. The ID corresponding to a placement, 
separated by partition walls. This was done to ensure the participants to stay ignorant of the 
other conditions, limit communication and to safeguard their anonymity from the others. The 
participant`s anonymity was also safeguarded by ensuring the double-blindness condition. 
This was done by having three lab-assistants with specified work tasks during the day of the 
experiment.  
                                                 
5 Of the 120 participants, 40% were men and 60% were women.  
6 The Digital Social Science Core Facility. Located at Rosenbergsgaten 35, Bergen, Norway.  




When seated the participants got some oral information. They were told not to communicate 
with each other during the experiment, and reminded of who financed the experiment and that 
it would be used in two Master`s theses. In addition, they were reinsured of their choices 
being kept anonymous.    
After the participants were finished evaluating the different hypothetical situations, they were 
asked to wait. In the meantime, the evaluations were handed to a lab assistant located in a 
separate room. For one randomly selected action, the evaluations were then sorted according 
to how the action was evaluated. From the pile with the majority of the ratings, two 
evaluations were randomly selected to receive an additional 500 NOK ($58). The money was 
distributed in the respective envelopes and handed to another lab assistant. The participants 
were then handed their envelopes, as the lab assistant called out the ID-numbers.  
On average, the norm eliciting experiment lasted 23 minutes. The expected payment, 
including the show-up fee, was 97 NOK (11,5 USD). This amounts to an hourly wage of 252 
NOK (31 USD) –a wage above the usual pay for undergraduates in Norway.  
 
4.2.2 The dictator game experiment   
The dictator game experiment consisted of four sessions with an average of 30 participants in 
each. In total, 116 students participated, whereof 30 percent were men and 70 percent were 
women. Hroot made sure that none of the students had participated in the norm elicitation 
experiment.  
The same experimental procedures applies to this experiment as the within-subject 
experiment. However, as the experiment had two different treatment conditions, and a 
between-subject design, some additional measures had to be taken regarding the 
randomization of the participants.  
Prior to the experiment, the two instructions were randomized using Random.org, and 
distributed accordingly. The randomization of the participants was done by letting them draw 
an ID-number while entering the lab. The ID corresponded to a seat and the respective 
randomized instruction. The randomization was thus done at an individual level and a within-
session randomization, as well as between-sessions with respect to the already randomized 
order of the instructions. The participants in the dictator experiments were thus unaware of the 
different conditions, and only knew of the condition they themselves took part in.  
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On average the dictator-experiment lasted 15 minutes, and had an expected pay of 106 NOK 
(13 USD), which amounts to an hourly wage of and 424 NOK (52 USD). This is a wage way 
above the usual pay for undergraduates in Norway.   
 
4.2.3 Between-subject designed experiment  
To test whether the design of the norm elicitation method in the laboratory experiments lead 
to undesired demand effects, a classroom experiment was conducted. The experiment took 
place March 30th 2017, at the Norwegian Business School (BI) at an introductory class to 
statistics for students studying marketing.  
Only the norm elicitation experiment was conducted. This time with a between-subject 
design. The experiment was once again run together with another Master student (Sondre 
Vågenes Michelsen), and in total, a number of 157 students attended8. Before starting the 
evaluations, a set of instructions was read out loud by the experimenter (see Appendix E). In 
the instructions they were informed that ten of them would end up with 500 NOK ($58). 
Each of the altogether 78 students participating in my experiment was asked evaluate one 
situation, being oblivious to it being one out of two different situations. The experiment was 
conducted by pen and paper, and they were given 5 minutes to finish their evaluations. 
  
                                                 
8 However, this time one participant only answered one treatment-condition, and thus half of the students 
provided data for my experiment.  
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4.3 Results  
The results are presented as follows: first, I will test whether there are any problems with 
using a within-design on the norm elicitation experiment. Then, I will test whether there are 
any treatment effect of framing the action as either “to take” or “to give”. Thereafter, the first 
main part of the analysis is presented, namely the testing of the hypothesis based on Smith`s 
theories of moral sentiments. The second main part of the analysis is regarding actual 
behavior. Based on the elicited social norms, predictions for actual behavior are then 
presented. The predictions are given the assumption that one can model behavior based on 
people having a preference to comply to social norms. The predictions are tested using data 
from the dictator experiment.   
 
 
4.3.1 Within-subject versus between-subject design   
Result 1: There are no systematic differences between the norms elicited with a within- and a 
between-subject design.  
The norm elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013) has only been conducted with a 
between-subject design (e.g. Erkut et al. 2015; Veselý 2015; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 
2015; D`Adda et al. 2016). Testing for demand effects, the results of the experiments with a 
within- and between-design are compared and tested. Table 3 and table 4, show both the 
evaluations and the test results of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  
As the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show, evaluations is only significantly different for the 
evaluation of “Give 250” (4,209***). However, for each of the other comparable actions, 
there were no significant differences in the evaluations of those from the within- and the 
between-subject design. 
Though the difference in evaluations of “Give 250” is highly significant, it might nevertheless 
be a result of noise. If so, this suggests that there are no systematic, if any demand effects with 
having one individual evaluating both the control and treatment situations. Thus, it should not 
be any problems with using a within-subject design for these situations. Accordingly, 
following results and analysis will mainly use the data from the within-design norm elicitation 
experiment. Regarding the modal evaluations, except for “Take 250” they are identical for 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.2 “Take” and “give” framing  
Result 2: There are some minor, but no systematic effect of framing the action as “to take” or 
“to give”.  
In table 5 the results from the between-subject norm elicitation experiment are shown together 
with the results form Wilcoxon Rank-sum tests (Mann-Whitney tests). The test tests for any 
differences in evaluations between treatment-conditions, for given payoff-equivalent actions. 
The results indicate that there are no significant differences between treatment-conditions. Put 
differently; people`s evaluations are unaffected of whether the action is frames as “to take” to 
“to give”. However, the sample sizes of the experiment with the between-subject experiment 
are small (N=39). Thus, there might be some small effect, which the analysis lacks statistical 
power to prove.  
For the within-subject designed norm eliciting experiment, the sample sizes are considerably 
larger (N=119). The results of the within-subject design experiment are reported in table 6, 
together with results from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The test result show no systematic 
framing effect of the treatment-condition.  
However, regarding the within-designed version there are some statistical significant 
differences between the two treatment-conditions. For all the significantly different 
evaluations, the actions framed as “to take” are evaluated as less socially acceptable than 
when framed as “to give”. To “take 1000” is evaluated as less socially appropriate than to 
“give 0” (-2,004**), and to “take 500” is seen as less socially acceptable than to “give 500” 
(2,127**). Though significant, the descriptive statistics of table 4 show that the effects are 
small, e.g. the significant effect of “take 500” against “give 500” stems from a difference in 
mean evaluations (and standard deviations) of 0,933 (0,235) and 0,977 (0,121), respectively. 
Nevertheless, the statistical significant results point in the direction of it being seen as less 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.3 The shape of the norm profiles  
Result 3: There is an asymmetry in the norm profile, and it is stable across treatments  
Figure 2 illustrates the norm profiles of all three treatment-conditions i.e. the mean 
appropriateness evaluation of each hypothetical action of the decision maker. As the figure 
displays, the norm-profiles are very similar across treatment-conditions.  
Figure 2  also reveals an asymmetry in the norm-profiles. As expected, the most socially 
appropriate action is an equal split, and thus the dominant social norm. When the decision 
maker allocates more than 50% to the recipient, the actions are evaluated as less socially 
appropriate, though still socially appropriate. However, when the decision maker allocates 
more than 50% to himself, the actions are always evaluated as socially inappropriate, on 
average. Thus, the norm profiles tells us that people care about more than purely the 
distribution. 
Using the dominant social norm as a reference point for rightful endowments, the norm 
profiles tells us that the decision maker is free to make allocations which compromises “his 
half” of the common pool. However, he is not free to allocate “the recipient`s half” if he 
wants his action to be judged as acceptable. If one is concerned with one`s action being 
considered socially acceptable, this might put some constraints on one`s behavior.   
As allocating more than half to the recipient is considered less socially acceptable than an 
equal split, it is reasonable to believe that few will choose such an action. Even though such 
an action would still be considered socially acceptable, you could achieve both more money 
and a higher degree of acceptance with the action of an equal split. 





























Payoff (NOK Person A, NOK Person B) 
Give Take Take, Personal
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4.3.4 The precision of the evaluations  
Result 4: The norm-profile of the “injustice domain” is more precise than the norm-profile of 
the “beneficence domain”, but only for the extremities of the distribution-equivalent actions.  
These results gives evidence to Smith`s theory of the moral rules of justice being more precise 
than the rules of beneficence.  
To clarify; the domains are defined by the norm-profile. Whereas the actions that are 
considered socially unacceptable belongs to the “injustice domain”, socially acceptable 
actions belong to the “beneficence domain”.  
 
Figure 3 and 4 show the norm-pofile of the “Give”  and “Take” treatment-conditions, 
respectively.  The figures also display the standard deviations of the means. They are based on 
data from the within-experiment. However, the norm-profiles of the between-subject designed 
experiment show the same pattern (see Appendix F).  
All norm-profiles follow the same pattern. Allocating half or more to the recipient belongs to 
the “beneficence domain”, and allocating less than half to the recipient are actions of the 
“injustice domain”. The standard deviations indicate that the social norms of the “beneficence 
domain” are quite vague, indicating a heterogeneity between individuals concerning what is 
the social norm. However, the norm-profiles also indicate that there is less variation in the 
evaluations of the “injustice domain”. Put differently: subjects seem to agree more about the 


























































Payoff (NOK Person A, NOK Person B)
Take
  Figure 4: Norm-profile with standard 
deviations of the means, “Take” 
Figure 3: Norm-profile with standard 
deviations of the means, “Give” 
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To test whether the differences in precision between the “injustice”- and “beneficence-
domain” are statistically significant, the variance in evaluations of distribution-equivalent 
actions are compared with Breusch-Pagan tests. The results are presented in Table 7.  
 
Table  7: Breusch Pagan test for distribution-equivalent actions within a treatment-condition 
The Breusch Pagan test tests for heteroscedasticity in a linear regression model. The results 
obtained in table 7, are based on the baseline regressions of the distribution-equivalent actions 
of a treatment-condition (see Appendix H). The squared estimated residuals from the baseline 
regressions are then used in auxiliary regressions. In the auxiliary regressions, the squared 
estimated residuals are regressed on the independent variables, being the evaluations of the 
two distribution-equivalent actions. The null-hypothesis is one of homoscedasticity. The R2 of 
the auxiliary regression used to calculate the LM-statistic, which under the null-hypothesis 
will approximately be a chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom.  
From the results presented in table 7, we can assume homoscedasticity for the evaluations of 
taking/giving nothing/everything. Even for a significance threshold 99 percentage level. From 
Figure 3, 4 and 6, we can conclude that the evaluations in the “justice domain” which has the 
lower variance. This result is robust across treatment-conditions. The same results are 
obtained in the between-subject designed experiment (see Appendix G).  
However, when testing the variance of evaluations of more equal distribution-equivalent 
((250,750) and (750,250)), we cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, and thus 
not say that the variances are statistically significant. Thus, we can only draw the conclusion 
that the evaluations are more precise in the “injustice domain”, but only for the extremities of 
the distribution-equivalent actions.   
 
     (1000,0) & (0,1000)     (750,250) & (250, 750) 
Treatment-condition Chi2(1) p-value n Chi2(1) p-value n
Give 37.76 0.000 239 1.22 0,270 238
Take 12.33 0.000 240 0.01 0.909 240
Take, personal 17.48 0.000 240 1.59 0.208 240 
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4.3.5 Putting yourself in the position of the decision maker  
 
Result 5: One`s own assessment of one`s hypothetical actions follow the norm-profile, but not 
perfectly.  
The results of this subchapter gives evidence to the claim made in the end of the subtitle 
added to the 4th addition of TMS : “An essay towards an Analysis of the Principles by which 
Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character, first of their Neighbors, and 
afterwards of themselves.9”  
As figure 5 shows, the evaluations of hypothetical personal behavior follow the norm profile. 
However, they do not follow each other perfectly. As the Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests 
presented in table 8 show, the evaluations are significantly different for the middle ranged 
actions (“take 750”, “take 500”, and “take 250”). However, the evaluation of an equal split is 
only statistically significant at the 90%-level.  
For the two other statistically significantly different evaluations, the subjects evaluate their 
own hypothetical actions as less socially appropriate than if somebody else conducted them. 
One might interpret this as subjects being stricter with themselves. However, that is not 
necessarily the case. There were no monetary incentive for this task, and the subject had 
nothing to gain by being truthful. However, Veselý (2015) suggests that people provide 
virtually identical responses with or without monetary incentives. Moreover, though the 
differences are significant, they are nevertheless small. In addition, the evaluations follow the 
same pattern as the norm-profile.  
                                                 

























































Payoff (NOK Person A, NOK Person B)
Take, personal
  
Figure 6: Evaluations of “take personal”, 
with  standard deviations 












































































































































































































































































































































To study whether the moral judgement of one`s own hypothetical behavior follow the norm-
profile, the variance of the evaluations is an important factor. Except for the evaluation of an 
equal split, figure 6 relative to figure 4 indicates that the standard deviations from the mean 
should be much the same.  
 
Results from a Breuch-Pagan test10, shown in table 9, gives strong evidence of a significant 
difference of evaluations of an equal split between “take” and “take personal”. Nevertheless, 
for all the other payoff-equivalent actions, there is no significant results for a significant 
threshold of 5%.  
If the measured evaluation in fact is representative of a valid social norm, then one´s 
evaluation of the morality of one´s own behavior should correspond to the evaluation of 
others behavior in an identical situation. Finding that the evaluations of one`s own 
hypothetical actions follow the norm-profile, gives evidence of having elicited a valid social 
norm. Thus, this evidence suggests that the norm elicitation method is valid. 
  
                                                 




Payoff Action Chi2(1) p-value 
(1000,0) "take 1000" 0.44 0.509
(750,250) "take 750" 0.08 0.781
(500,500)  "take 500" 11.95 0.001
(250,750) " take 250 " 2.71 0.100
(0,1000) "take 0" 0.01 0.918
Table 9: Breusch-Pagan test for payoff-equivalent actions between the “take” and 
“take, personal” treatment-conditions 
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4.3.6 Evaluations across treatment-conditions at an individual level   
Result 6:  About 80 percent evaluate the payoff-equivalent actions equally across treatment-
conditions, but only about 16 percent evaluate distribution-equivalent actions equally.   
A within-subject design gives us the possibility to study evaluations across treatment-
conditions at the level of the individual. Table 10 gives the descriptive statistics on how large 
a percentage of the participants evaluated payoff-equivalent situations equally, or to which 
degree they did not.  
Table 10 shows that about 80 percent of the individuals evaluate the payoff-equivalent 
situations equally across treatments. It also shows the same pattern in percentages across 
treatment-conditions. The highest percentage of equal evaluations of the action of an equal 
split, and the lowest is the action of the decision maker allocating 750 NOK to himself.        
However, when it comes to the distribution-equivalent actions, people tend not to evaluate 
them equally. Table 11 gives the percentages of the participants that evaluated the 
distributional-equivalent actions equally, and the percentages of those who did not. On 
average, across treatment-conditions, only 14,5 percent evaluated the distributional-equivalent 
actions of allocating everything/ nothing to the recipient equally. Furthermore, 17,5 percent 
evaluated allocating 250 NOK/ 750 NOK equally across the treatment-conditions. Hence, 
only 16,2 percent evaluated distribution-equivalent actions equally across treatment-
conditions.  
 
      Take and Give (percent)  Take and Take-Personal (percent) 
Pay-off Equal +1/-1 +2/-2 +3/-3 Equal +1/-1 +2/-2 +3/-3
(1000,0) 82.4 13.4 2.5 1.7 86.7 8.3 5.0
(750,250) 61.0 35.5 3.4 63.3 32.5 4.2
(500,500) 93.2 5.1 1.7 92.5 6.7 0.8
(250,750) 77.5 18.3 4.2 75.0 18.3 5.8 0.8
(0,1000) 71.7 20.8 4.2 3.3 75.8 18.3 1.7 4.2
Average 80.3 18.6 3.2 1.0 78.7 16.6 3.5 1.0 
Table  10: Evaluations at an individual level, between treatment-conditions 
Table  11: Evaluations at an individual level, of distribution-equivalent actions (percentage) 
 
   Evaluations of (1000,0) vs. (0,1000) Evaluations of (750,250) vs. (250,750) 
Condtion Equal +1/-1 +2/-2 +3/-3 Equal +1/-1 +2/-2 +3/-3
Give 12.6 21.9 21.9 44.6 17.8 35.6 42.3 4.2
Take 13.3 21.6 18.3 46.7 17.5 38.3 38.3 5.8
Take, personal 17.5 17.5 26.7 38.3 18.3 38.5 35.8 7.5
Average 14.5 20.3 22.3 43.2 17.9 37.5 38.8 5.8
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4.3.7 Predictions based on elicited social norms  
 
Having tested the hypotheses based on Adam Smith`s theories of moral rules of conduct, it is 
time to make some predictions for actual behavior. Based solely on the already presented 
results, i.e. the elicited norm profiles and their precision, the following predictions are made 
regarding behavior in the dictator game experiments:  
 
Prediction I: The subjects` behavior will in large be unaffected by whether the action 
is framed as “to take” or “to give”.  
Prediction II: Most dictators will chose to split the resource equally between himself 
and “Person B”.  
Prediction III: As it is more socially appropriate with an equal split than to give more 
than half to the recipient, almost no one will chose to allocate more than 50% to the 





4.3.8 Balanced samples?  
If the characteristics of the subjects involved in the norm eliciting tasks are different from 
those whose behavior is observed, the explanatory power of the elicited norms may be 
reduced (D’Adda et al. 2016). Thus, it is important for the samples to be balanced across 
experiments.  
Table 12 shows a summarization of the personal characteristics of the participants of the 
dictator experiments and the norm elicitation experiment with a within-subject design.  
 
 
 Give  Take   Give and take, total  Norm eliciting  
Man  0,293 (0,46) 0,317 (0,47)  0,299 (0,46) 0,400 (0,49) 
Education 3,448 (0,99) 3,448 (0,99)  3,44 (0,99) 3,525 (0,86)  
Experience  0,895 (1,08)  0,983 (1,05)  0,948 (1,06)  1,125 (1,15)  
n 59 57  116 120 
Note: The table displays the mean (standard deviation) for the different personal characteristics of the 
participants in the dictator experiment with the treatment groups ‘Give’ and ‘Take’, and the norm eliciting 
experiment. The variable ‘Man’ indicated the sex and is a dummy-variable, which takes the value ‘1’ for a man. 
‘Education’ is an ordinal variable where 1= 1st semester, 2= 2nd semester, 3= 3rd semester, and 4= more than 
three semesters. ‘Experience’ is also an ordinal variable, and give information regarding the participant`s 
experience with experiments. For ‘Experience’ 0= no experience, 1= once, 2= twice, and 3= three times or more. 
 
 
For the dictator experiment, there are only minor deviations between the treatment groups. 
The samples are thus balanced with respect to all the sample characteristics. However, the 
samples also need to be balance across experiments. Compared to the norm elicitation 
experiment, there are a higher share of women to men in the dictator experiments. On 
average, the participants in the norm eliciting experiment have a slightly higher level of 
education and are somewhat more experienced with experiments. Nevertheless, the 
characteristics of the samples are mostly balanced. Thus, with respect to these sample 
characteristics, there should not be any loss of explanatory power of the elicited social norms.    
Table  12: Sample Characteristics 
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4.3.9 The dictator games –testing the predictions 
Result 7: The elicited norm-profiles predicts observed behavior  
To answer the predictions based on the norm elicitation experiment, the results from the two 
dictator experiments are used.  
Prediction 1: The subjects` behavior will in large be unaffected by whether the action is 
framed as “to take” or “to give”. 
To provide an answer to the first prediciton derived from the norm eliciting experiment, I will 
first present some descriptive statistics. Figure 7 shows the means and the standard errors of 
the means of the respective treatment-condition. The figure gives strong evidence of there 
being no difference between two. This, both due to the small difference in means (341,7 NOK 
for “Give” and 348,2 NOK for “Take”) and due to the standard errors overlapping almost 
entirely. Additionally, when tested with a Wilcoxon rank sum test, the means of the dictator 
experiments turned out not statistically significantly different (z-value of -0,039, and p-value 










Even though Figure 7 and the Wilcoxon rank sum test gives strong evidence of the framing of 
the action having no effect on behavior, it is worth studying the distributions of amounts 
allocated to “Participant B”. Figure 8 shows the distributions of amounts distributed to 
“Person B” by “Person A” in both treatment conditions. The figure shows two quite similar 





















Prediction II: Most dictators chose to split the resource equally between himself and 
“Person B”. 
Figure 8 shows that the most common distribution made by the dictator is an equal split of the 
common resource. Respectively, the action is chosen by 55,0 percent and 50,0 percent in the 
“Give”- and “Take”-treatment. This is thus in line with the prediction based on the norm 
elicitation experiment, where dividing the resource equally was evaluated as the most socially 
appropriate action.  
Prediction III: As it is more socially appropriate with an equal split than to give more than 
half to the recipient, almost no one will chose to allocate more than 50% to the recipient.   
The distributions of figure 8 also gives evidence of the third prediction. The distributions are 
heavily skewed to the left as almost no one chose to give more than 500 NOK to the recipient 
( 3,6 percent (“Take”) and 1,7 percent (“Give”)).   
However, if one bluntly base predictions on the elicited norms, few would break the norm as 
it is considered socially inappropriate. Figure 8 show that this is not the case. In both 
treatments, a relatively large percentage allocate less than half to the recipient (43,4 
percentage in the “give” treatment, and 46,4 percentage in the “take” treatment). This cannot 
be explained by social norms alone. Rather, it can be seen as a defense of a model modeling 















Amount allocated to Person B 
Give % Take %
Figure 8: Distribution of amounts allocated to Person B by Person A in the Dictator Experiment 
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Chapter 5: Concluding remarks 
Finding that is possible to conduct the norm elicitation method of Krupka and Weber (2013) 
with a within-subject design, opens up new possibilities for applications of the method. Also 
contributing to the validity of the results, is the fact that subject’s evaluations of their own 
hypothetical behavior follow the norm-profile. Altogether, the results suggests that the 
method gives strong enough incentives for people to reveal the social norm.  
The dominant social norm is an equal split, and about half of the participants comply. This 
suggests that although the decision maker is granted full allocation rights, there seem to be 
some social pressure in form of a social norm linked to the available actions.  
Though some minor framing effects, people`s evaluations are most affected by what the 
action entails. The experiment gives evidence of an asymmetry in the norm-profiles and of 
people agreeing more about what is socially inappropriate than what is appropriate. In other 
words, the social norms of the “injustice-domain” is more precise than the norms of the 
“beneficence-domain”. Nevertheless, data from the dictator experiments show that almost half 
of the participants violates the norm by allocating more than 50 percent to themselves. Such 
behavior cannot be explained by social norms alone. Rather it supports Krupka and Weber`s 
(2013) modeling of behavior as a trade-off between compliance to social norms and monetary 
payoff. However, as the social norms of the “beneficence domain” are vague due to a 
heterogeneity in individual`s beliefs, it might be an idea not to operate with a common social 
norm in this domain. Rather, for the “beneficence domain”, one might suggest to use each 
individual`s beliefs about the social norm (denoted as𝑁𝑖(𝑎𝑘)), making for individual utility 
functions:                                         𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑘) = 𝑉(𝜋(𝑎𝑘)) +  𝛾𝑁𝑖(𝑎𝑘)                             (2) 
 
For future research, it would be interesting to make the dictator experiment more social (e.g. 
remove the dictator`s anonymity) to study whether people behave more in line with the social 
norm. To study the impact of property rights on social norms, I conducted an experiment 
where I varied the property rights between a standard and a “bully” dictator game. The 
experiment was conducted by the Norwegian Citizen Panel. However, the results were 
delayed, and I was therefore unable to fit it into the thesis. A robustness check for the results 
of this thesis could be to test if it matter whether it is “Person A” or “Person B” who is the 
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Appendix A: Instructions, dictator experiment 
[Norwegian]  
Deltaker ______  
 
Vennligst fyll ut: 
 
Kjønn: 
Kvinne ____ Mann ____ 
 
Hvor mange semestre har du studert på høgskole eller universitet? 
Første semester ____  Andre semester ____ 
Tredje semester ____  Flere enn tre semester ____  
 
Har du deltatt i lignende eksperiment før? 
Nei ____ Ja, 1 gang ____ Ja, 2 ganger ____ Ja, 3 eller flere ____ 
 
På neste side vil dere bli presentert for to spørsmål hvor dere i begge blir bedt om å ta en 
avgjørelse. Vennligst svar på begge spørsmålene.  Når eksperimentet er over, vil 2 personer i 
rommet trekkes ut til å få realisert sitt valg enten i spørsmål 1 eller spørsmål 2. Valget du tar 





Person A og person B trekkes tilfeldig ut. Av en felles pott på 1000 kroner, kan person A 
bestemme hvor mye han eller hun skal gi av pengene i potten. Det person A gir, mottar person 
B, og det resterende beløpet beholder person A selv.    
 
Dersom du trekkes ut til å være person A, må du velge om, og i så fall hvor mye, du skal gi. Du 
kan velge mellom å gi ingenting (0 kroner), 250 kroner, 500 kroner, 750 kroner eller alt (1000 
kroner).  
 
Jeg velger å gi:  Ditt svar: 
Ingenting 
(1000 kr til deg, 0 kr til person B) 
 
250 kr 
(750 kr til deg, 250 kr til person B) 
 
500 kr 
(500 kr til deg, 500 kr til person B) 
 
750 kr 
(250 kr til deg, 750 kr til person B) 
 
Alt 







Person A og person B trekkes tilfeldig ut. Av en felles pott på 1000 kroner, kan person A 
bestemme hvor mye han eller hun skal ta fra pengene i potten. Det person A tar, beholder 
person A selv, og det resterende beløpet mottar person B  
Dersom du trekkes ut til å være person A, må du velge om, og i så fall hvor mye, du skal ta. Du 
kan velge mellom å ta ingenting (0 kroner), 250 kroner, 500 kroner, 750 kroner eller alt (1000 
kroner).  
 
Jeg velger å ta: Ditt svar 
Ingenting 
(0 kr til deg, 1000 kr til person B) 
 
250 kr 
(250 kr til deg, 750 kr til person B) 
 
500 kr 
(500 kr til deg, 500 kr til person B) 
 
750 kr 
(750 kr til deg, 250 kr til person B) 
 
Alt 
(1000 kr til deg, 0 kr til person B) 
 
 
 Translated version: 
Participant: _______ 
Please fill out:  
Sex:  
Female ______ Male_____ 
How many semesters have you studied at a university or a collage?  
First semester _____  Second semester______ 
Third semester_____   More than three semesters _____ 
Have you previously participated in an experiment?  
No___  Yes, once ____  Yes, twice ____  Yes, three or more _____ 
On the next page, you will be presented for two questions where you in both will be asked to 
make a decision. Please answer both questions. When the experiment is over, two participants 
in the lab will be randomly selected to get one of their choices realized. The choices you make 
will be anonymous, and will not affect the probability to receive payment.  
“Dictator, give”  
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Person A and Person B is randomly selected. Of a common pool of 1000 NOK, Person A is 
able to decide how much of this money he or she should give. What Person A gives is 
received by Person B, and the remaining amount is kept by Person A.  
If you are selected to be Person A, you have to make a choice on whether to give, and in that 
case how much you want to give. You can choose between giving nothing (0 NOK), 250 
NOK, 500 NOK or everything (1000 NOK).  
I choose to give:  Your answer: 
Nothing 
(1000 NOK for you, 0 NOK to Person B) 
 
250 NOK 
(750 NOK for you, 250 NOK to Person B) 
 
500 NOK 
(500 NOK for you, 500 NOK to Person B) 
 
750 NOK 
(250 NOK for you, 750 NOK to Person B) 
 
Everything 





“Dictator, take”  
Person A and Person B is randomly selected. Of a common pool of 1000 NOK, Person A is 
able to decide how much of this money he or she should take. What Person A takes is kept by 
Person A, and the remaining amount is received by Person B.  
If you are selected to be Person A, you have to make a choice on whether to take, and in that 
case how much you want to take. You can choose between taking nothing (0 NOK), 250 
NOK, 500 NOK or everything (1000 NOK).  
I choose to take:  Your answer: 
Nothing 
(0 NOK for you, 1000 NOK to Person B) 
 
250 NOK 
(250 NOK for you, 750 NOK to Person B) 
 
500 NOK 
(500 NOK for you, 500 NOK to Person B) 
 
750 NOK 
(750 NOK for you, 250 NOK to Person B) 
 
Everything 





Appendix B: Instructions, norm elicitation experiment  
[Side 1] Deltaker ____ 
 
Kjønn: 
Kvinne ____ Mann ____ 
 
Hvor mange semestre har du studert på høgskole eller universitet? 
Første semester ____  Andre semester ____ 
Tredje semester ____  Flere enn tre semester ____  
 
Har du deltatt i lignende eksperiment før? 
Nei ____ Ja, 1 gang ____ Ja, 2 ganger ____ Ja, 3 eller flere ____ 
 
[Side 2] Instruksjoner  
Instruksjon 
 
I dette eksperimentet vil du bli presentert for ulike hypotetiske situasjoner der «Person A» står 
overfor et valg. Situasjonen vil bli presentert med en beskrivelse av valget personen står 
overfor, samt mulige handlinger.  
 
Etter at du har lest beskrivelsen av situasjonen, vil du bli bedt om å evaluere hvor sosialt 
akseptabel og i samsvar med god moral og passende oppførsel, hver av de ulike handlingene 
er. Handlingene skal evalueres på en skala fra «Veldig sosialt uakseptabelt» til «Veldig sosialt 
akseptabelt.» Med sosialt akseptabelt mener vi oppførsel som folk flest vil være enig om at er 
«rett» eller «etisk». En annen måte å forstå det på, er at dersom en person velger en sosialt 
uakseptabel handling, vil andre kunne bli opprørt over personens oppførsel. For å gi en idé om 
hva du skal gjøre, følger det under et eksempel.  
 
Eksempel 
Person A er på en kafé nær universitetet. Her oppdager Person A at noen har glemt 
lommeboken sin på et av bordene. Person A må bestemme seg for hva som skal gjøres med 
lommeboken. Det er fire mulige handlinger: Ta lommeboken, spørre andre i nærheten om de 
eier lommeboken, la lommeboken ligge der den er eller gi lommeboken til personalet.  
Vennligst evaluer hver av de ulike handlingene, marker dine svar med et kryss. Eksempel: 
 








Ta lommeboken X 
   
Spørre andre i 
nærheten  








til personalet  






Etter eksperimentet vil det trekkes ut en tilfeldig handling. Av de deltakerne som har 
evaluert denne handlingen likt som flesteparten av de andre deltakerne, trekkes 3 
deltakere ut og får utbetalt 500 kr. Dersom du har evaluert handlingen ulikt flesteparten 




[Side 3] Situasjon 1 
 
Anta at person A og person B er tilfeldig uttrukket, og at av en felles pott på 1000 kroner, kan 
person A bestemme hvor mye han eller hun skal gi av pengene i potten. Det person A gir, mottar 
person B, og det resterende beløpet beholder person A selv. Person A kan velge mellom å gi 
ingenting (0 kroner), 250 kroner, 500 kroner, 750 kroner eller alt (1000 kroner). 
 
Tabellen under viser de ulike valgene person A kan foreta seg. Vennligst indiker hvor sosialt 
akseptabel hver av de fem handlingene er. Husk at du er med i trekningen om 500 kr dersom 
din evaluering av en tilfeldig trukket handling, er lik evalueringen til flertallet av de andre 
deltakerne. Marker dine svar med kryss. 
 
 












Gi ingenting  
(1000 kr til A, 0 
kr til B) 
    
Gi 250 kroner  
(750 kr til A, 
250 kr til B) 
    
Gi 500 kroner  
(500 kr til A, 
500 kr til B) 
    
Gi 750 kroner  
(250 kr til A, 
750 kr til B) 
    
Gi alt  
(0 kr til A, 1000 
kr til B) 











[Side 5] Situasjon 3 
 
Anta at person A og person B er tilfeldig uttrukket, og at av en felles pott på 1000 kroner, kan 
person A bestemme hvor mye han eller hun skal ta fra pengene i potten. Det person A tar, 
beholder person A selv,  og det resterende beløpet mottar person B. Person A kan velge mellom 
å ta ingenting (0 kroner), 250 kroner, 500 kroner, 750 kroner eller alt (1000 kroner). 
 
Tabellen under viser de ulike valgene person A kan foreta seg. Vennligst indiker hvor sosialt 
akseptabel hver av de fem handlingene er. Husk at du er med i trekningen om 500kr dersom din 
evaluering av en tilfeldig trukket handling, er lik evalueringen til flertallet av de andre 
deltakerne. Marker dine svar med kryss. 
 
 












Ta ingenting  
(0 kr til A, 1000 
kr til B) 
    
Ta 250 kroner 
(250 kr til A, 
750 kr til B) 
    
Ta 500 kroner  
(500 kr til A, 
500 kr til B) 
    
Ta 750 kroner  
(750 kr til A, 
250 kr til B) 
    
Ta alt 
(1000 kr til A, 0 
kr til B) 




[Side 6] Situasjon 5 
 
Anta at du og en annen person i rommet er tilfeldig uttrukket, og at av en felles pott på 1000 
kroner kan du bestemme hvor mye du skal ta fra pengene i potten. Det du tar beholder du selv, 
og det resterende beløpet mottar den andre deltakeren. Du kan velge mellom å ta ingenting (0 
kroner), 250 kroner, 500 kroner, 750 kroner eller alt (1000 kroner). 
 
Tabellen under viser de ulike valgene du kunne ha foretatt deg. Vennligst indiker hvor sosialt 
akseptabelt du hadde syns hver av de fem handlingene hadde vært dersom du selv hadde foretatt 

















Ta ingenting  
(0 kr til deg, 1000 
kr til den andre) 
    
Ta 250 kr  
(250 kr til deg, 750 
kr til den andre) 
    
Ta 500 kr  
(500 kr til deg, 500 
kr til den andre ) 
    
Ta 750 kroner  
(750 kr  til deg, 
250 kr  til den 
andre ) 
    
Ta alt  
(1000 kr til deg, 0 
til den andre) 
    
 
Translated version  
[Page 1]  
Participant: _______ 
Please fill out:  
Sex:  
Female ______ Male_____ 
How many semesters have you studied at a university or a collage?  
First semester _____  Second semester______ 
Third semester_____   More than three semesters _____ 
Have you previously participated in an experiment?  
No___  Yes, once ____  Yes, twice ____  Yes, three or more ____ 
[Page 2] Instructions  
For this experiment, you will be presented for different hypothetical situations where “Person 
A” faces different choices. The situations will be presented with a description of the choice 
“Person A” faces, as well as with possible actions.  
 
After having read the description of the situation, you will be asked to evaluate how socially 
acceptable and in compliance with good morals and appropriate behavior, each of the 
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different actions are. The actions are to be evaluate on a scale from “Very socially 
inappropriate” to “Very socially appropriate”. With socially appropriate, we mean behavior 
which most people would agree to be “correct” or “ethical” behavior. Another way of 
understanding it is, if the person chooses a socially unacceptable action, others will get upset 
over the person`s behavior. To get an idea of what you are asked to do, you are given an 
example below.  
Example  
Person A is at a café close to the university. Person A notices that someone have left their 
wallet on one of the tables. Person A has to decide what to do with the wallet. There are four 
possible actions: Take the wallet, ask someone close by is it is their wallet, let the wallet be, 
or to give the wallet to the personnel.  
Please evaluate each of the different actions, and mark your answers with an X. Exemplified:  
 
 













   
Ask someone 
close by   







Give the wallet 
to the 
personnel  




After the experiment, one action will be randomly selected. Of the participants who have 
evaluated this action in the same way as most of the participants have done, three will be 
randomly selected to get paid an additional 500 NOK. If you have your evaluation 
differs from the majority of the other participants, you will not be in the running for the 




[Page 3] Situation 1 
 
Suppose that Person A and Person B are randomly selected, and that from a commonly owned 
pool of 1000 NOK, Person A is able to decide how much he or she is to give of the money. What 
Person A gives, Person B receives, and the remaining amount is kept by Person A. Person A 
can choose between giving nothing (0 NOK), 250 NOK, 500 NOK, 750 NOK, or everything 




The table below shows the different choices available to Person A. Please indicate how socially 
appropriate you find each of the five different actions. Remember that you are in the running 
for 500 NOK if your evaluation of the randomly selected action, is in equal to the evaluations 
of the majority of the other participants. Mark you answers with an X.  
 
 












Give nothing  
(1000 NOK to 
A, 0 NOK to B) 
    
Give 250 NOK  
(750 NOK to A, 
250 NOK to B) 
    
Give 500 NOK  
(500 NOK to A, 
500 NOK to B) 
    
Give 750 NOK  
(250 NOK to A, 
750 NOK to B) 
    
Give everything  
(0 NOK to A, 
1000 NOK to B) 








[Page 5] Situation 3   
 
Suppose that Person A and Person B are randomly selected, and that from a commonly owned 
pool of 1000 NOK, Person A is able to decide how much he or she is to take of the money. What 
Person A take, Person A keeps, and the remaining amount is received by Person B. Person A 
can choose between taking nothing (0 NOK), 250 NOK, 500 NOK, 750 NOK, or everything 
(1000 NOK).  
 
The table below shows the different choices available to Person A. Please indicate how socially 
appropriate you find each of the five different actions. Remember that you are in the running 
for 500 NOK if your evaluation of the randomly selected action, is in equal to the evaluations 





















Take nothing  
(0 NOK to A, 
1000 NOK to 
B) 
    
Take 250 NOK  
(250 NOK to A, 
750 NOK to B) 
    
Take 500 NOK  
(500 NOK to A, 
500 NOK to B) 
    
Take 750 NOK  
(750 NOK to A, 
250 NOK to B) 
    
Take 
everything  
(1000 NOK to 
A, 0 NOK to B) 
    
 
[Page 6] Situation 5  
Suppose you and another person in the room is randomly selected, and that from a common 
pool of 1000 NOK you can decide how much of the money to take. What you take, you keep, 
and the remaining amount is received by the other person. You can choose between taking 
nothing (0 NOK), 250 NOK, 500 NOK, 750 NOK, or everything (1000 NOK).  
 
The table below shows the differnt actions available to you. Please indicate how socially 
appropriate you would find each of the five different actions, if you were the one who had 















Take nothing  
(0 NOK to you, 
1000 NOK to B) 
    
Take 250 NOK  
(250 NOK to 
you, 750 NOK 
to B) 
    
Take 500 NOK  
(500 NOK to 
you, 500 NOK 
to B) 
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Take 750 NOK  
(750 NOK to 
you, 250 NOK 
to B) 
    
Take 
everything  
(1000 NOK to 
you, 0 NOK to 
B) 





Appendix C: Invitation e-mail, DIGSSCORE experiments  
Norwegian: 
 












Du er invitert til å delta i et eksperiment tirsdag 28.02.17. Du vil motta 50 kroner 
for oppmøte, og eksperimentet er finansiert av Universitetet i Bergen. 
 
I tillegg til dette kan du tjene ytterligere penger. Disse pengene 
utbetales til deg når eksperimentet er over. Eksperimentet utføres 
anonymt, og det er frivillig å delta. Det kreves ingen forkunnskaper. 
 
Eksperimentet varer omtrent 15 minutter, og vil holdes på Medborgerlaben 
i Sofie Lindstrøms hus (Rosenbergsgaten 35) i andre etasje.  
 
Du kan melde deg på ved å logge på din profil her: https://medborgerlab.app.uib.no/ 
Hi, 
 
You are hereby invited to participate in an experiment Tuesday 28.02.17. You will receive 50 NOK as a show 
up fee, and the experiment is financed by the University of Bergen. 
 
In addition, you will be given the opportunity to make an additional sum of money. You will be paid the earned 
sum of money after the experiment. You will be anonymous, and participation voluntarily. No previous 
knowledge is needed.  
 
The experiment will last roughly 15 minutes, and take place at the Citizen Lab of Sofie Lindstrøms hus 
(Rosenbergsgaten 35) at the second floor.  
 
To register, pleace log on to your private profile at: https://medborgerlab.app.uib.no/ 
59 
 
Appendix D: Reminding email, DIGGSCORE experiments  
Norwegian:  
 
Translated version:  
Subject: Reminder of invitation  
Text:  
  
Good morning  
This is a reminder concerning you being invited to an experiment tomorrow, Thuesday 28.02.17.  
If you wish to participate, please go to https://medborgerlab.app.uib.no/ to choose an appropriate time.  
For questions, contact smi100.at.student.uib.no 
60 
 
Appendix E: spoken instruction, between-subject experiment  
Norwegian:  
Hei 
Vi er to masterstudenter fra Universitetet i Bergen, som er her for å gjennomføre et kort 
økonomisk eksperiment i pausen. Eksperimentet er finansiert av Institutt for Økonomi ved 
UIB og vil ta rundt 5 minutter. Det er muligheter for å vinne ekte penger basert på svarene 
man gir, og det er frivillig å delta.  
Litt praktisk informasjon før vi begynner.  
- Dere får utdelt et ark med instruksjoner på fremsiden og et spørsmål på baksiden. 
Vennligst les instruksjonene nøye 
- Ta vare på den gule post-it lappen med deltakernummer på, dersom du vinner penger 
må du vise denne  
- Vennligst ikke snakk med hverandre under eksperimentet 
- Dere vil få 4 minutter til å gjennomføre eksperimentet, vi gir beskjed når det er 1 
minutt igjen 
- Dersom noen blir ferdig før, vennligst bli sittende å vente til alle er ferdig.  
- Ved spørsmål, rekk opp en hånd 
 
Da begynner vi å dele ut arkene.  




We are two Master students from the University of Bergen, who are here to do a short 
economic experiment during the break. The experiment is financed by the Faculty of 
Economics at UiB, and wil last about five minutes. You will have the opportunity of making 
real earning, and participation is voluntary.  
A bit of practical information before we start.  
-You will each be handed a paper with instructions at the front, and a question on the back. 
Please read the instructions carefully.  
-Please take keep the yellow post it glued on the front of your paper. If you are to win money, 
you`ll need it to identify yourself.  
-Please do not talk to each other during the experiment.  
-You will have four minutes to complete the questionnaire. We`ll let you know when there is 
one minute left. If you should finish before the time is up, please be seated.  
-If you have any questions, please raise your hand.  
Now we will start handing out the papers. Please start.  
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Appendix G: Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity and 
baseline regressions, between-subject design   
 




Baseline regressions for the Breusch-Pagan test:  
  
             (1000,0) & (0,1000)             (750,250) & (250, 750)  
Treatment-condition Chi2(1)  p-value  n   Chi2(1)  p-value n 
Give  15.01 0.000 78  6.51 0.011 78 
Take  19.61 0.000 77   2.62 0.11 78 
 
                        Treatment-condition "Give" vs. "Take" , between design  
Constant  Give 0  Give1000 R² N 
0.282* -1,145*** (baseline) 0.469 78 
(0.099)  (0.140)      
          
Constant  Give250 Give750 R² N 
0.404*** -0.668*** (baseline)  0.300 77 
(0.084)  (0.118)      
          
Constant  Take1000  Take250 R² N 
0.402*** -1,299*** (baseline) 0.603 78 
(0.085) (0.121)     
          
Constant  Take750 Take250 R² N 
0.504*** -0,667** (baseline) 0.387 78 




Appendix H: Breusch-Pagan baseline OLS-regression results, 
distributional-equivalent actions within a treatment-condition 
 
The baseline regressions are of the type:  𝑦 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜀  , where the dependent variable (y) 
is the appropriateness ratings, x is the ratings of one of the payoff-equivalent actions, and the 
other action used as a baseline represented by α.  
 
       Treatmentcondition "Give"   
                    Distribution equivalent actions (0,1000) and (1000,0)  
Constant  Give0 Give1000 R² N 
0.389***  -0.243***  (baseline)  0.554 239 
(0.051)  (0.072)       
                  Distribution equivalent actions (250,750) and (750,250)  
Constant  Give250 Give750 R² N 
0.589*** -0.747*** (baseline)  0.378 238 
(0.044) (0.062)      
     
          Treatmentcondition "Take"   
                  Distribution equivalent actions (0,1000) and (1000,0)  
Constant  Take0 Take1000 R² N 
-0.761*** 1.111*** (baseline) 0.332 240 
(0.059)  (0.083)      
                 Distribution equivalent actions (250,750) and (750, 250)  
Constant  Take250 Take750 R² N 
-0.083* 0.683*** (baseline) 0.332 240 
(0.044) (0.063)      
     
                                   Treatmentcondition "Take, personal"  
                 Distribution equivalent actions (0,1000) and (1000,0)  
Constant  P-take0 P-take1000 R² N 
-0.772*** 1.072*** (baseline)  0.417 240 
(0.058)  (0.082)       
                Distribution equivalent actions (250, 750) and (750, 250)  
Constant  P-take250 P-take750 R² N 
-0.178*** 0.683*** (baseline)  0.293 240 




Appendix I: Breusch-Pagan baseline OLS-regression results of 
payoff-equivalent actions  
                                Treatment-condition "Take" vs. "Take, personal"  
Payoff Constant  P-take1000 Take1000  R² N 
(1000, 0)  -0.761*** -0.011 (baseline)  0.000 240 
  (0.047) (0.067)     
            
Payoff Constant  P-take750 Take750 R² N 
(750, 250) -0.083* -0.094 (baseline) 0.009 240 
  (0.045) (0.064)     
            
Payoff Constant  P-take500 Take500 R² N 
(500,500) 0.933*** 0.033 (baseline) 0.002 240 
  (0.019) (0.026)     
            
Payoff Constant  P-take250 Take250 R² N 
(250,750) 0.6*** -0.094 (baseline) 0.008 240 
  (0.048) (0.068)     
            
Payoff Constant  P-take0 Take0 R² N 
(0,1000)  0.35*** -0.05 (baseline) 0.001 240  
  (0.068) (0.096)       
 
